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Communication Matters: 
U.S. Monetary Policy and Commodity Price Volatility 
 
Abstract 
Using a GARCH model, we analyze the influence of U.S. monetary policy action and 
communication on the price volatility of commodities for the period 1998–2009. We find, 
first, that U.S. monetary policy events have an economically significant impact on price 
volatility. Second, expected target rate changes and communications decrease volatility, 
whereas target rate surprises and unorthodox monetary policy measures increase it. Third, we 
find a change in reaction to central bank communication during the recent financial crisis: the 
“calming” effect of communication found for the whole sample is partly offset during that 
period. 
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1.  Introduction 
During the recent financial crisis, many newspapers reported a “flight to gold” (e.g., The 
Telegraph, January 6, 2008). Investors consider gold a safe investment because it is a hard 
store of value. Thus, in times of financial uncertainty and extraordinary provision of liquidity 
by many central banks, gold and other commodities are seen as safer investments than stocks, 
currencies, or other financial products. However, de facto, gold prices are almost as volatile as 
S&P 500 returns.
1 Therefore, one should view gold, or other commodities, as just another 
asset in an investor’s portfolio that is influenced by the same macroeconomic news as are 
other financial assets. In line with this view, Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) document a 
relationship between monetary policy news and commodity prices. 
Thus, according to Frankel’s (1986) theoretical model, we expect news about U.S. 
monetary policy, such as (unexpected) interest rate changes, to play an important role in 
commodity prices.
2 Over the past two decades, (informal) communications about the state of 
the economy and the future course of monetary policy have become useful additions to central 
bankers’ toolkits. To accommodate this development in monetary policy, we also incorporate 
several communication channels regularly used by Federal Reserve (Fed) officials in our 
analysis. However, in our dataset, news regarding economic outlook and future monetary 
policy does not have a clear effect on commodity returns.
3 Hence, our analysis focuses only 
on the volatility of commodity prices and we find significant, systematic, and robust volatility 
reactions to monetary policy over the sample period 1998–2009. 
In this paper, we address three research questions. First, do U.S. monetary policy 
events have an economically significant impact on the price volatility of commodities? 
Second, if so, do markets react differently to official rate changes versus (informal) 
communications? Third, is there a different reaction to monetary policy measures during the 
financial crisis, which began in August 2007, compared to the period before? Extant literature 
focuses on monetary policy actions and commodity returns; this is the first study to examine 
the price volatility of commodities using monetary policy actions and communications. 
                                                 
1 During our sample period (1998–2009), the standard deviation of gold (S&P 500) returns is 1.15 (1.37). For 
both assets, the standard deviation increases considerably during the financial crisis starting on August 7, 2007: 
gold, 1.62; S&P 500, 2.08. 
2 Empirical evidence for the influence of monetary policy actions on commodity prices is provided (among 
others) by Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) and Frankel and Rose (2010). Barsky and Kilian (2004) show that 
monetary policy stance is useful as a predictor of commodity prices. Finally, Bernanke et al. (1997) illustrate that 
oil price shocks induce a monetary policy response that can amplify the contractionary effects of the oil price 
shock itself. 
3 This is in line with the findings of Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985), who also discover a state-dependent 
reaction of commodity prices to monetary policy news. 4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
construction of monetary policy news and presents the econometric methodology. In Section 
3, we illustrate our results. Section 4 concludes with the policy implications of our findings. 
 
2.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
In our analysis, we use a new data set introduced and described in detail in Hayo et al. (2008, 
2011). One of the advantages of this data set is that it covers the recent crisis period. The data 
set contains 837 speeches and 201 congressional hearings by Board of Governors members, 
as well as 94 post-meeting statements and 26 monetary policy reports (MPR). Our analysis 
incorporates a subset of these events: only those communications containing information on 
either the U.S. economic outlook or the Fed’s future monetary policy course are included. In 
addition to these (informal) communications, we also analyze expected target rate changes 
and target rate change surprises.
4 Finally, we integrate several variables controlling for the 
unorthodox measures undertaken by the Fed during the financial crisis.
5 Table A1 in the 
Appendix summarizes the frequency of these events. 
Our commodity indicators comprise daily growth rates on five sub-indices of the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index over the period 1998–2009 (2,993 observations): 
agricultural, energy, livestock, industrial metals, and precious metals.
6 Descriptive statistics 
show that all series exhibit excess kurtosis, but almost no skewness, indicating volatility 
clustering (Engle, 1982). Thus, we employ the following GARCH(1,1) specification 
(Bollerslev, 1986): 
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whereand are parameters or vectors of parameters and t is independent 
and identically distributed. 
The general specification is an autoregressive-distributed lag model with six lags. The 
vector of control variables contains past commodity returns as well as returns on three U.S. 
                                                 
4 Bloomberg surveys are used to identify surprises from scheduled meetings. Intermeeting moves are classified 
as surprises. 
5 (i) Discount rate change on August 17, 2007, (ii) announcement of joint initiatives with the federal government, 
(iii) announcement of additional unilateral liquidity actions, (iv) announcement of internationally coordinated 
liquidity actions, and (v) announcement of measures to mitigate problems in the asset-backed security market. 
6 Data source: Global Financial Indicators. 5 
financial indicators: S&P 500 index, 10-year government bonds, and broad U.S. dollar 
exchange rate index.
7 The contemporaneous financial returns are omitted to avoid 
simultaneity problems. (Expected and unexpected) target rate changes, Federal Reserve 
communications (statements, monetary policy reports, testimony, and speeches), and 
unorthodox measures are included in the variance equation (ht) on the day the news actually 
reaches the respective market. To disentangle the influence of Fed actions and 
communications during the financial crisis from the ones during “normal times,” we create 
additional interaction variables for the former during the financial crisis.
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3.  Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the results for the variance part of Equation (1). In general, expected target 
rate changes and communications decrease volatility, whereas target rate surprises and 
unorthodox monetary policy measures increase it. The median conditional variances range 
from 0.82 (precious metals) to 3.93 (energy). Thus, the coefficients for target rate surprises 
and unorthodox measures are of particular relevance. Nonetheless, all other communication 
types and expected target rate changes play a noticeable role, too. To summarize, monetary 
policy actions and communications are important determinants of commodity volatility, a 
finding new to the literature. 
Communication lowers price volatility over the whole sample. This is in line with 
findings by Hayo et al. (2008), who obtain similar results for U.S. bond and equity markets. 
They interpret this as an indication of central bankers’ role as financial market 
“psychologists.” By communicating with the public, they can calm the market. During the 
financial crisis, we mostly find a positive interaction effect for the communication variables. 
This implies that the “calming” effect is partly offset as, apparently, central bank news 
requires an adjustment of portfolios. However, only in the case of livestock do we find a 
significantly positive influence. 
                                                 
7 Day of the week effects are not included as they provide no significant results. 
8 We had two reasons for deciding against separate estimations for pre-crisis and crisis periods and in favor of a 
nested model. First, we can statistically test for differences across coefficients. Second, the number of 
observations for each subsample varies considerably (2,392 during normal times; 601 during the crisis). 6 
Table 1: Explaining Price Volatility of Commodities 
   Agricultural    Energy    Livestock   Industrial  Metals    Precious  Metals 
Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
ARCH  0.062 0.00
  
  0.053 0.00
  
  0.065 0.00
  
  0.156 0.00
  
  0.062 0.01 
  
GARCH  0.506 0.00   0.893 0.00   0.889 0.00   0.371 0.00   0.903 0.00 










...Financial Crisis  0.162  0.21 –0.041 0.44 –0.043 0.01 0.859 0.01 0.057 0.03 








 0.013 0.92 
* 
…Financial Crisis  –0.976  0.18   0.511 0.69   –0.273  0.38   –0.518 0.77   –0.983 0.02 









  …Financial Crisis  13.111 0.01 –5.059 0.21 0.386 0.54 0.737 0.72 1.420 0.44 
Unorthodox Measures  ––– –––
  
  ––– –––
* 
  ––– –––
  
  ––– –––
* 
  ––– ––– 
  
…Financial Crisis  2.653  0.24   1.637 0.02  –0.006  0.96   3.674 0.02  0.463 0.25 









  …Financial Crisis  0.111  0.88 –0.719 0.47 0.398  0.17 0.597 0.60 0.113 0.79 
Monet. Policy Reports  –1.399 0.00
  
  –1.010 0.03
  




 –0.161 0.07 
  
…Financial  Crisis  0.794  0.39  4.743 0.05  0.353  0.38  1.134 0.53   –0.606 0.16 








  –0.257 0.00 
  
…Financial Crisis  1.362  0.35   2.024 0.26   0.772 0.02  –2.222 0.05   0.659 0.12 










…Financial  Crisis  0.450 0.46  –0.219 0.69   0.161  0.39   0.857 0.39  –0.342 0.05 
Notes: Only the results for the variance part of Equation (1) are shown. Full tables are available on request. 
Bold coefficients are significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
The first row between each set of lines is the effect over the whole sample period; the “Financial Crisis” row below that shows the interaction effect during the financial crisis. 
* (**) indicates joint significance of both coefficients at a 5% (1%) level. 
 7 
Expected target rate changes also lead to a decline in price volatility. Financial 
investors apparently see no reason to make large portfolio adjustments if the central bank’s 
interest rate decision matches their expectations. This result holds over the whole sample and 
during the financial crisis. In contrast, if the interest rate change is higher or lower than 
expected or implemented at an unscheduled meeting, price volatility increases. This effect is 
even larger during the financial crisis. Finally, unorthodox measures (such as joint initiatives 
with the government) result in higher volatility, probably because they increase investor 
concern about financial stability. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
Using a GARCH model, we analyze the influence of U.S. monetary policy action and 
communication on the price volatility of commodities for the period 1998–2009. Our analysis 
provides answers to three research questions. 
First, U.S. monetary policy events do have an economically significant impact on the 
volatility of commodity prices. Second, expected target rate changes and communications 
decrease volatility, whereas target rate surprises and unorthodox monetary policy measures 
increase it. Third, we find a change in reaction to central bank communication during the 
recent financial crisis: the “calming” effect of communication found for the whole sample is 
partly offset during that period. 
Our results have several interesting implications for investors and policymakers. First, 
in addition to observing formal announcements, investors would do well to pay attention to 
informal communication of U.S. monetary policy. These informal communications are used 
to prepare financial markets for upcoming interest rate changes and thus have an influence on 
those markets. Second, policymakers interested in decreasing the volatility of markets should 
increase the frequency of their communications. Timely and appropriate communication can 
lessen the impact, or deter altogether, monetary policy surprises, which increase volatility. 
Third, the diminished influence of communication during the financial crisis suggests that the 
usual “calming” effect of communication was weaker during that period. Apparently, it was 
more difficult for central bankers to convince investors that their actions would be effective 
during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that monetary policy has a larger risk effect on 
commodity markets than wealth effects. Thus, when building optimal asset portfolios, 
investors need to be aware that commodities are not necessarily a safe investment. Our 
evidence suggests that even tangible assets with a hard store of value, such as commodities, 
are subject to fluctuations in financial markets. Given that the volatility reaction of 8 
commodities to monetary policy action and communication is similar to that of other financial 
markets, for instance, bonds or stock markets, the potential to reduce portfolio risk by 
including such assets as a means of diversification may be limited. 
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Table A1: Frequency of Monetary Policy Events 
   Overall Sample Financial Crisis 
Target Rate Moves  49  10 
Target Rate Surprises  13  5 
Unorthodox Measures  33  33 
Statements 76  21 
Monetary Policy Reports  26  4 
Testimony 35  14 
Speeches 150  27 
Note: The “Overall Sample” column shows the number of events during the sample period 1998–2009; the 
“Financial Crisis” column gives the frequency during the subsample starting on August 7, 2007. 